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1. Introduction 
 
Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe’s paper “Splitting a difference of opinion” studies an 
important type of dialogue shift, namely that from a deliberation dialogue over action or policy 
options where critical and persuasive argumentation is exchanged about the rational acceptability 
of the policy options proposed by various parties, to a negotiation dialogue where agreement is 
reached by a series of compromises, or trade-offs, on the part of each side in the disagreement. 
Van Laar and Krabbe identify and analyze two fallacies that pertain to different aspects 
(or moments) of this dialogue shift, and they provide prescriptive advice for their avoidance. The 
first fallacy is that of bargaining, and concerns when the dialogue shift from a persuasion 
dialogue to a negotiation dialogue is licit rather than illicit. The fallacy of bargaining, they write 
(p. 7), involves “substituting offers for arguments,” and occurs when “the persuasion dialogue 
isn’t closed off properly at all and the [dialogue] shift [to negotiation] occurs without both 
participants being aware of it and agreeing to go along with it” (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 
110; cf. van Laar and Krabbe, p. 7). The second fallacy is that of middle ground, and involves 
mistaking a compromise, which is analyzed as the resolution of some second-order 
disagreement, with the resolution of the first-order disagreement. 
Van Laar and Krabbe argue for three main conclusions. First, they claim that there are 
situations in which this type of dialogue shift, from persuasion to negotiation, is legitimate. They 
(pp. 16-17) claim that 
 
within a persuasion dialogue, participants may have good reasons for shifting 
towards a negotiation dialogue in which they cooperate to settle their different of 
opinion by way of compromise. Splitting a difference of opinion may be a 
sensible idea, and the shift towards negotiation can be made without committing 
the Fallacy of Bargaining. 
 
Indeed, beyond participants having good reasons for such a shift, van Laar and Krabbe intimate 
(p. 4) that, at times, this type of shift may, in some contexts, be the only path to settling a 
disagreement between parties and thereby reaching an agreeable, actionable, policy option. 
Second, they (p. 17) argue that “a compromise that splits a difference of opinion is quite different 
from a resolution of a difference of opinion, and that splitting a difference of opinion does not 
imply that the Fallacy of Middle Ground has been committed,” but rather that “finding a 
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compromise implies that a potential second-order difference of opinion admits of a resolution.” 
Third, van Laar and Krabbe argue (p. 17) that, while negotiation involves argumentation about 
different kinds of things than did the initial persuasion dialogue, it involves rational 
argumentation nonetheless.  
Having no disagreement with the third claim, in this brief commentary, I first offer a brief 
summary of the position van Laar and Krabbe advance in their paper, and I understand it. I then 
voice some concerns about the treatment they offer for each fallacy. 
 
2. Splitting the difference of opinion: a brief summary 
 
2.1. The fallacy of bargaining 
 
In section 2 of their paper, van Laar and Krabbe (p. 2) address two questions concerning shifts 
from persuasion to negotiation dialogues: what legitimate reasons might there be for such shifts? 
and under what conditions would such shifts be legitimate? They (p. 2) are careful to distinguish 
between the resolution and the mere settling of a difference of opinion (citing van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2004, pp. 57-58), claiming that the shift to a negotiation dialogue does not provide 
a resolution to a difference of opinion, and indeed that it occurs only when a proper resolution is 
not attainable.1 Their claim is that the move to a negotiation dialogue can settle an initial 
difference of opinion by resolving a different, but related difference of opinion. 
Van Laar and Krabbe answer the second question as to the dialectical occasions that 
would legitimately authorize a shift from persuasion to negotiation dialogue by identifying the 
following possible outcome of a persuasion dialogue: 
 
Each party (i) maintains its own, original standpoint (in the case of a mixed 
dispute), and (ii) maintains its critical stance towards the standpoint of the other 
party (p. 3).  
 
In such situations, and in answer to their first question, van Laar and Krabbe (pp. 5-7) identify 
five reasons that parties might have for moving from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation and 
for accepting a negotiated compromise in place of the result of the failed persuasion dialogue. 
Briefly, they are: 
 
1. The strategic argument: “By arguing you achieve nothing. By negotiation you 
achieve at least something.” 
2. The argument for principled consequentialism: “It would just be wrong to 
neglect the possibility of realizing at least part of your aims.” 
3. The epistemic argument: “Neither of us can be sure of having a complete view 
of all aspects of the situation and a deal might do justice to a wider array of 
considerations.” 
4. The democratic argument: “Making a deal with contributions from both sides 
is more democratic than a one-sided solution.” 
                                                 
1 Here, a resolution is understood as the normative end point of a critical discussion where a proponent either 
retracts a standpoint, having failed to successfully defend it from a respondent’s criticisms, or where a respondent 
accepts a standpoint on the basis of the argumentation offered by its proponent in response to the critical reactions of 
the respondent (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 133). 
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5. The community-based argument: “To compromise would help to build a 
community.” 
 
In view of considerations like these, van Laar and Krabbe argue, the shift from a persuasion 
dialogue to that of a negotiation can be legitimate, particularly in cases of practical contested 
reasoning about action prescriptions or policy options. 
 
2.2. The fallacy of middle ground 
 
Once the shift to a negotiation dialogue occurs, the fallacy of middle ground becomes possible. It 
is introduced, in section 3, as “the fallacy of confusing a compromise with a first-order resolution 
of the difference of opinion that prompted the parties to compromise” (p. 9). Crucial to 
understanding this fallacy, then, is understanding the difference between a compromise and a 
resolution. Van Laar and Krabbe (p. 8) adopt Weinstock’s (2013, p. 539) characterization of a 
compromise as marked by two characteristics: it is inferior to the initial, preferred positions of 
each party in the debate, but nevertheless which each party has reason to accept instead of their 
favored position. Perhaps more accurately stated, this second condition is one where each party 
to the dispute has reason to accept the compromise position in place of their initial, preferred 
position rather than an outcome on which the first-order dispute remains unsettled such that no 
agreement is reached and no position is mutually adopted. As van Laar and Krabbe (p. 8) put it, 
“parties … only subscribe to the compromise for the reason that each of them happens to be 
unable to realize the adoption of its own preferred policy.”  
Van Laar and Krabbe (pp. 8-9) proceed to identify five characteristic features of 
compromises. (i) Compromises involve mutual concessions, and are different from resolutions 
because “Strictly speaking, a compromise does not end the disagreement” (Benjamin 1990, p. 7). 
(ii) Compromises are the result of free choices of discussants, rather than being imposed or 
coerced. (iii) Compromises involve both action commitments and propositional commitments on 
the part of the discussants. (iv) Compromises result from a quid pro quo exchange and thereby 
involve a kind a “commodification” of one’s opinions. Lastly, (v) “compromise implies a 
resolution of second-order issues” since “a compromise does seem to eliminate a potential 
disagreement of some sort, to wit a disagreement about the second-order issue of how to deal 
with the problem that the first order issue of what policy to pursue is irresolvable” (p. 9). 
 
3. The fallacy of bargaining 
 
I have two concerns about the shifts from persuasion to negotiation dialogues that don’t seem to 
be covered in the discussion offered by van Laar and Krabbe. The first concerns the legitimacy 
of such dialogue shifts epistemic contexts, or contexts where epistemic considerations are 
relevant; the second concerns a kind of strategic maneuvering that is designed to shift a dialogue 
from what should, properly be a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation. 
 
3.1. Epistemic contexts 
 
From an epistemic perspective, it is important that van Laar and Krabbe limit their consideration 
of standpoints at issue to those concerning “dialogues about an action proposal” (p. 4) – i.e., 
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deliberation dialogues about policy options, directives, or prescriptive action proposals, and other 
claims of this sort. 
In non-epistemic contexts, while one might construe the dispute as concerning the 
rational acceptability or merits of some policy proposal, what really seems to be at issue in the 
object-level dispute is the maximal satisfaction of competing sets of goals. At least, there is no 
fallacy involved in the shift from looking at the issue one way to looking at it in the other. By 
contrast, in epistemic contexts such shifts seem always to be illicit. After all, what it at issue in 
epistemic contexts are the rational merits of competing claims and these are not the sorts of 
things that can be gained through bargaining or traded away. 
Consider two parties arguing over the acceptability of competing speculative hypotheses, 
for example. Suppose that the argumentative dialogue concludes with the situation van Laar and 
Krabbe envision, whereby each party retains their commitment to their initial standpoint, neither 
party accepts as satisfactory the other’s replies to the critical considerations raised against their 
standpoint, and likewise neither party concedes any of the criticisms raised by the other. At one 
level, this might be seen as the failure of a critical discussion. Seemingly, something has gone 
wrong and the parties are simply being intransigent, or there is a deeper disagreement in need of 
resolution that underwrites the surface disagreement about the opposing standpoints. 
Yet, in such a context, the arguments for moving to a negotiated compromise all seem to 
fail. Arguments 1, 2, 4, and 5 all fail because they reference the wrong kind of criteria for the 
epistemic acceptability of some position. In such a situation, it is better to either stick to one’s 
guns (maintain steadfast commitment) or to suspend judgement (withdraw commitment), each in 
the name of continued inquiry, rather than to move to adopt some middle ground judgement. 
Against the strategic argument, epistemically speaking, nothing is achieved by negotiation – at 
least nothing epistemically worthwhile. Against the argument from principled consequentialism, 
in inquiry one’s epistemic aims are to accept all and only true claims (for which one has 
adequate reason to believe), and those ends are not advanced by compromising epistemic 
standards, or trading-off the contents of positions, in the name of expediency or agreement. 
Against the democratic argument, truth does not side with a majority, or multi-sided opinion. 
Rather, we explain the rightness of the opinions of the many in terms of their truth; not the truth 
of opinions in terms of their being held by the many. Against the community argument, 
epistemically speaking building a community around a falsehood, or a truth for which we lack 
adequate reason to believe, is not to be preferred over having justified truths which may divide a 
community. Building good community relations is not an epistemically good reason for holding 
false or unjustifiable opinions. In each case, the kinds of considerations cited for concession and 
moving to a negotiated settlement are epistemically irrelevant. Of the reasons to move to a 
negotiation, then, only the epistemic argument remains. And, while this argument cites 
epistemically relevant considerations – that our own views are incomplete and fallible, 
epistemically speaking – those considerations do not warrant a dialogue shift from a persuasion 
dialogue (be it a critical discussion or inquiry) to a negotiation. Merely incorporating a broader 
range of considerations is not a good epistemic reason for altering one’s position, unless one also 
believes that those other considerations are epistemically sound and well-taken. In which case, 
the epistemically correct course of action is to moderate one’s commitments in proportion to the 
evidence one has for them, not to commodify one’s opinions as though one could barter one’s 
way to the truth. 
Epistemically speaking, the only positions worthy of endorsement are those that are best 
supported by the evidence. Yet, by hypothesis, negotiation dialogue does not proceed according 
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to those object-level considerations about the rational or evidential merits of either position; 
rather it proceeds according to second-level considerations about goal satisfaction. Yet, if the 
goal is to attain true, rationally justified views, then acting to satisfy that goal would prescribe 
returning to the object-level dispute in search of a resolution, or at least further inquiry and 
evidence, rather than any dialogue shift from truth-directed persuasion to negotiation. In such 
contexts, a compromise is not an epistemically sound outcome, and negotiation is not an 
epistemically responsible course of action. 
And, to the extent that the relative merits of policy or action-proposals depend on 
epistemic considerations, this same problem would resurface. For example, consider two parents 
going through a bitter separation, each of whom are making a case for sole custody of the 
children (an action outcome, or policy decision) by claiming that the other is an unfit parent (a 
factual claim). Suppose further that the issue is to be resolved by mediation, and that over the 
course of the mediated proceedings, neither side gives an inch: neither manages to establish their 
case to the satisfaction of the other, yet neither gives up their position, nor their criticisms of the 
other’s position. Suppose they now opt for shared custody as a negotiated concession. While this 
might be a compromise each is willing to make rather than lose custody entirely (such that each 
has a reason to opt for it as a concession), given that it does not resolve the issue of their fitness 
as parents, such a settlement ought to be manifestly unacceptable to any rational, third-party 
judge. Rather, joint custody should only be a viable option in the case where each parent is 
actually a fit parent—i.e., in the case where the first-level issues are actually resolved.2 
 
3.2. Prosecutorial overcharging and the plea bargain to be read in the presentation 
 
Disputes like this suggest another context that represents a moral hazard for dialogue shifts of 
this kind. The practice of overcharging defendants accused of crimes is woefully common, 
particularly in North America. Benjamin Theule (2012) describes the practice in this way: 
 
One of the most common strategies used by prosecutors is to “overcharge” a 
defendant. There are a number of strategic reasons why prosecutors may 
overcharge those accused of a crime. The key reason is that deputy district 
attorneys know that they must move a large volume of cases through the court 
system. The way this is accomplished is via plea bargaining and negotiation. 
Prosecutors know that when they overcharge cases (e.g. charging a felony for a 
true misdemeanor violation) this encourages a guilty plea in exchange for a 
reduction in the charge to the offense that should have been charged originally. 
 
Theule (2012) gives the following as an example: “Sometimes those who shoplift merchandise 
worth a relatively modest value will be charged with Burglary … rather than the more 
appropriate charge of … Petty Theft.” 
                                                 
2 I take it that analogous considerations could be raised with respect to things like the climate change example used 
in van Laar and Krabbe, and in other cases where the rightness or rational merits of policy options depend on the 
answers to questions of fact. It is not merely that the partial satisfaction of some goal set might be nil, such that any 
compromise actually be entirely unacceptable, as in the case of “half-measures” action on carbon emissions with 
respect to the devastating effects for human populations of climate change. Rather, it is that the acceptability of the 
policy options themselves are based on considerations that are inherently extraneous to, and not addressed in, 
negotiation dialogues. 
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Such a move might be considered a kind of strategic maneuvering by a proponent within 
argumentative dialogue. It involves putting forward an initial standpoint that (perhaps grossly) 
overstates one’s position such that, while one might have little hope of successfully defending it 
as a standpoint, the actual standpoint one hopes to defend and establish represents a significant 
concession to the one initially asserted, and one which, the proponent hopes, they can negotiate 
to, rather than be obliged to argue for. 
While it might seem that the increased burden of proof attached to making such 
assertions would be sufficient to deter arguers from overstating their positions in this way, social 
and institutional circumstances often make it entirely worthwhile for them to do so. For instance, 
in the case of prosecuting the burglary versus petty theft charge, the prosecutor will have to 
prove their accusations only when the case goes to trial. In the interim, though, several non-
argumentative pressures will act to motivate the accused to simply accept (by pleading guilty to) 
the lesser charge, even though they might maintain their innocence even to it. For example, 
having been accused of the more serious crime, the defendant will have more onerous bail 
conditions, and will be more likely to be held in custody rather than released pending trial. This 
can have severe social consequences for them, such as losing their job, losing contact with their 
family or support network, not to mention their loss of liberty while their case is pending trial 
(Theule 2012). Similarly, the consequential risks of failing to defend against the more serious 
charges are dire. While conviction of the misdemeanor charge might only result in a short 
detention in a county jail, conviction on the felony charge might come with a much longer, 
perhaps mandatory, sentence in a state prison where the conditions of incarceration are much 
harsher (Theule 2012). As Theule (2012) points out, considerations like these exert coercive 
pressure upon the accused to agree to the lesser charge without argument, by plea bargaining—
i.e., negotiation. While none of these are good reasons for the claim at issue – that the accused is 
guilty of either offence – they are each good practical reasons for the defendant to concede to the 
lesser offense, so long as truth is not their only, or predominant discursive goal. Ultimately, then, 
this strategy has the effect of relieving the proponent (the prosecutor, in this case) from ever 
having to make the case for their position (either the overstated or their ‘actual’ one), and from 
ever having to establish it argumentatively. Rather, by overstating their initial claim, they can 
coercively induce a negotiated settlement upon their actual, desired position without ever having 
to meet their argumentative obligations. 
Now, it might be objected that this kind of case does not fit the proposed model precisely 
because the outcome is coerced, thereby failing to meet van Laar and Krabbe’s “freely chosen” 
condition (ii) of compromises. Yet, if this kind of strategic maneuvering were really deemed 
coercive in the contexts in which it actually occurs, such as the example just discussed, then it 
would be prohibited. Yet, it is not. Indeed such plea bargained settlements can only be 
considered as just outcomes of the judicial process insofar as they are freely chosen by the 
accused, whose statement of guilt as part of plea agreement involves a tacit acceptance of the 
factual claim forming the substance of the charge. And, in argumentative situations that are less 
strictly regulated, such as those of everyday argumentation, or political policy debate, there is 
very little in the regulatory environment to prevent its employment. Given what I take to be the 
manifest normative unacceptability of such maneuvering, I would suggest that the transition 
from persuasion to negotiation dialogue is a far riskier transition than has been thus far 
recognized, and one deserving of greater regulation in institutional contexts and greater 
skepticism or reluctance in the contexts of much ordinary argumentation. 
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4. The fallacy of middle ground 
 
Let me now turn to considerations relating to the fallacy of middle ground as it is treated in van 
Laar and Krabbe’s paper. 
Recall that the fallacy of middle ground is introduced as “the fallacy of confusing a 
compromise with a first-order resolution of the difference of opinion that prompted the parties to 
compromise” (p. 9). Since, on van Laar’s and Krabbe’s account, a compromise, by its very 
nature, neither resolves nor eliminates a first-order disagreement, it might be asked: in what 
sense does it settle the matter? 
Here, the answer seems to be that compromises are proposed as resolutions to “a 
disagreement about the second-order issue of how to deal with the problem that the first order 
issue of what policy to pursue is irresolvable” (p.9).  
 
If a compromise is the outcome of a conversation in which the parties have (also) 
exchanged arguments about the best way to deal with this second-order issue [just 
mentioned], the compromise will imply a special kind of resolution. … [A] 
compromise that results from an argumentative exchange about the merits of this 
way of dealing with the first-order issue [i.e., shifting to a negotiation dialogue 
and going with the results of that instead of making further attempts to rationally 
resolve the first order disagreement] implies a second-order resolution. (p. 9) 
 
And, more to the point, the negotiation process, if successful, results in settling, though, not 
resolving the first-order dispute by providing a mutually agreeable first-order action policy. Yet, 
the reason for classifying the agreement resulting from negotiation as different from a content-
equivalent agreement resulting from persuasive argumentation seems to be based solely on how 
the agreement was reached, not on what is agreed upon, or on the discursive standing that the 
agreed-upon commitment will have going forward. 
 
4.1. Are negotiated settlements first- or second-order commitments? 
 
At this point, the following question might be asked: are the concessions or compromises made 
during negotiations, moves made at the first or second level of debate? Effectively, the policy 
proposals resulting from negotiated settlements will function as, indeed, will take the place of, 
first-order policies. If concessions are second-order moves, it is difficult to see how they could 
settle first-order disagreements, and result in first-order action policies. So, if the reasons 
transacted over the course of the second-order negotiation dialogue are not also good reasons for 
a first-order resolution of the persuasive argumentation, it is difficult to understand why the 
result of that second-order dialogue should have standing as a first-order commitment. If, on the 
other hand, concessions are first-order moves, then it is difficult to understand why the first-order 
settlements resulting from negotiations are not thereby instances of the fallacy of middle ground. 
Which leads one to ask, is the fallacy of middle ground always a fallacious? 
Previously, I argued that in certain kinds of disagreements, characterized by 
predominately epistemic ends, the kinds of considerations offered in support of a dialogue shift 
from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation fail. Consider now cases where the kinds of 
considerations appealed to in making the case for the shift from a persuasion dialogue to a 
negotiation dialogue properly carry weight. That is, situations where strategic and principled 
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consequentialist considerations about the partial satisfaction of a goal set are good reasons for 
shifting the dialogue, and likewise where considerations as to the democratic inclusiveness or 
community-building ends motivating a compromise have merit, or finally where the mere 
inclusion of alternative perspectives and additional considerations are themselves good reasons 
for adopting a negotiated settlement. Why represent these considerations as reasons supporting a 
dialogue shift and a resolution of a second-order issue about the right way to solve an otherwise 
insoluble first-order disagreement? In these kinds of cases, it would seem that the very 
considerations motivating the dialogue shift speak just as well to the proper resolution of the 
first-order disagreement. If democratic inclusiveness is a good reason for a second-order 
compromise, it would seem to be an equally good reason for modifying one’s first-order position 
as to the rationally optimal policy. That is, it seems to speak directly to the object-level merits of 
the relevant policy options. 
Take, for example, a modified prisoner’s dilemma where the prisoners are allowed to 
exchange arguments before deciding on their respective action policies. Suppose that the 
prisoner’s dilemma has the following outcome matrix: 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Prisoner B 
Cooperate Defect 
Prisoner A 
Cooperate A3/B3 A0/B5 
Defect A5/B0 A1/B1 
 
Notice that, from each prisoner’s individual perspective, the preferred outcome is that they 
should defect while the other cooperates. Yet, these goal sets represent incompatible outcomes. 
Rationally speaking, the mutually optimal outcome is that each should cooperate. Suppose now 
that that the prisoners are able to exchange reasons about reaching a mutually optimal outcome, 
yet for some reason that discussion fails to reach a resolution. Each insists on sticking with their 
original position that they should defect while the other should cooperate. Suppose further that, 
at this point, they stop discussing the rational merits of each policy option, and instead move to a 
negotiation. Here, we can imagine a bargain of the sort where one prisoner says to the other, “If I 
think that you will defect then so will I, but if you commit to cooperating then so will I.” What 
should make that offer appealing to the other prisoner? Well, the fact that both will be better off 
if each cooperates rather than defects, and, indeed, that mutual cooperation rather than mutual 
defection represents the mutually optimal outcome in the situation. Yet, if this is correct, then the 
very same reasons that make a concession reasonable in this circumstance – i.e., that each should 
cooperate rather than defect and risk that the other will do the same – count equally as to what 
the rationally optimal policy solution is in the situation.  
If this is correct, then in the kinds of cases where a shift from a persuasion to a negotiation 
dialogue is legitimate there is no fallacy of middle ground. Second-order rationally negotiated 
settlements seem to be coextensive with rationally acceptable resolutions to first-order 
disagreements, and the reasons properly motivating each seem also to be coextensive. What is 
perhaps more interesting is the rhetorical reason of why those reasons should have more 
purchase with arguers when transacted as concessions to an initial position of some opponent 
rather than as positive reasons supporting some third position that neither discussant initially 
held. 
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